To alleviate a macro bias of structural differentiation theory a micro corrective taking into account institutional projects, organization building, and support enlistment strategies allows for description of new levels of differentiation based on "comparative and historical case studies of structural change" (Colomy and Rhoades 1994: 547). Despite claims that macro and micro levels allow for analytic or empirical reduction (Blau 1987; Collins 1981), recognition of their interpenetration has given significant impetus to comprehensive perspective that seeks to resolve the conceptual distinction between these levels of analysis via integrative theoretical frameworks (Munch and Smelser 1987; Ritzer 1990a, 1990b). Conceptual and empirical shortcomings of either macro or micro approaches open possibilities for their theoretical reconstruction that incorporates neglected analytical dimensions into research programs of multiple speciality areas. To correct macro bias evidenced in its limited empirical validity, structural differentiation theory has to integrate into its conceptual framework notion of institutional entrepreneurs, theory of social movements, and studies of comparative and historical structural change. Critical examination of the insufficient place micro-macro link occupies in structural differentiation theory demonstrates necessity for its micro corrective.
Alexander (1987) reformulates Parson's (1937) means and ends conceptualization as "micro-translation of norms and conditions" (Colomy and Rhoades 1994: 548) into theory of social agency where micro and macro levels of analysis are linked. Such reconceptualization of social agency incorporates microsociological theories as cases of emphasis on analytical dimension of individual coordination between micro and macro levels so that rational choice theory conceptualizes the macro-micro link as immediate costs calculation, phenomenological sociology and ethnomethodology as order-seeking activity, and symbolic interactionism as individual interpretation (Colomy and Rhoades 1994: 548). Whereas micro theories treat macro structures as residual categories contingent on but distinct from action, macro theories "specify their pertinent dimensions" (Colomy and Rhoades 1994: 549) so that hermeneutic, structural, Durkheimian, and Weberian theories refer to macro level in terms of normative complexes while conflict and Marxist theories in terms of conditional elements. Micro theories can be shown to describe social action along two complementary dimensions of interpretation and strategization the former of which includes typification and invention processes while the latter includes reward maximization and cost minimization.
The two dimensions of action interact since interpretative understanding contributes to production of relevant knowledge for strategic action at the same time as interpretive efforts extend to phenomena manipulated by strategic action. That emergent qualities and constraining effects of social order cannot find adequate explanation by means of micro theories has lead to attempts at their contingent integration with macro theories via conditional effects of macro environments on individual action that reflexively reproduces them. Parsons' division of social systems into society, culture, and personality corresponds to dimensions of social differentiation and political institutions, of solidarity bonds and sense of community, and of social roles and norms and sanctions. Cultural systems affect action along both interpretation and strategization dimensions by supplying reality descriptions, drawing moral boundaries, and institutionalizing value classifications. Capacities of interpretation and strategization of personal systems vary both over life cycle and across social systems. Dimensions of interpretation and strategization "enable actors to formulate new courses of action and recreate their environments" (Colomy and Rhoades 1994: 550) at the same time as the latter limit the contingent action.
Within the research program of structural differentiation theory micro refers to activities of individuals and groups that propose and implement structural alterations into the institutional order while macro characterizes environmental conditions informing and constraining these activities. Without conceptual model of micro dynamics macro environments are treated as actors by such theories as Marxist, neo-Marxist, and Weberian reifications of social classes and the state even though they are incisive as macro accounts of social transformation (Evans et al. 1985; Hindess 1986; Skocpol 1985). Weak theorization of macro processes exceedingly shifts the analytical balance in favor of micro level that hypervoluntarist treatment of party politics in Marxist tradition (Lenin [1902] 1929) and of charismatic leadership in Weberian tradition (Dow 1968; Fagen 1965) exemplify. Overlooking micro dynamics, structural differentiation theory (Alexander 1992) has largely treated environments as causal actors and has attributed contingency of individual action to systemic agency. A classical work on structural differentiation, Durkheim's The Division of Labor in Society ([1893] 1933) connects greater social complexity to higher levels of specialization while it attributes structural adjustments in resources distribution to environmental pressures rather than to individual and group contributions.
Based on Weber's analysis of social institutions, Parsons (1966, 1971) pays more attention to historical detail than does Durkheim at the same time as he likewise neglects individual and group impact on structural change while depicting macro dynamics of institutions and societies. Smelser (1959) offers more sophisticated model of social differentiation which, however, is "almost exclusively concerned with the interface between subsystems and their environments" (Colomy and Rhoades 1994: 552) as a form of interplay between institutions and social structures. Adopting an interest oriented explanatory model Smelser (1974, 1985, 1990, 1991) has combined functionalist analysis of macro environments with Tocqueville's notion of estates and with primordial groups allowing him to discuss micro dynamics more compellingly even though without avoiding the conflation of macro and micro dimensions. From post-Parsonian perspective, Luhmann (1982, 1990, 1992) explains transition from stratificatory differentiation to functional differentiation via "movement to greater structural complexity" (Colomy and Rhoades 1994: 552) of social systems that undergo self-referential evolution triggered by interaction with their environments. In this regard, Munch (1985), while favoring in his analysis interaction between systems over individual and group agency, offers more pluralist than Parsons' analysis of institutional change making it conditional on "existing traditions, consistency with general values, directedness towards collective goals, and adaptability to changing situations" (Colomy and Rhoades 1994: 553).
Accounting for its limited empirical support, the macro bias of differentiation theory follows from treating systems as agents responding to changes in their environments that cause them to differentiate over and above individual and group efforts. Theoretical attention to contribution of individual actors to the process of structural differentiation will bring micro-macro link to bear on explanation of how systems "select one course of institutional change over another" (Colomy and Rhoades 1994: 553). The growing awareness of impact that individual and group agency has on structural change (Champagne 1992b; Colomy 1990a) accounts for departures from macro interpretation of structural differentiation that emphasize blunted differentiation (Smelser 1990), unequal differentiation (Champagne 1990), uneven differentiation (Champagne 1992a; Colomy 1985) , dedifferentiation (Lechner 1990; Tiryakian 1992), and incomplete differentiation (Surace 1992). Explanatory frameworks of differentiation remain incomplete without attention to micro processes of "coalition formation, negotiation, and group conflict" (Colomy and Rhoades 1994: 554). Understanding of consequences of differentiation has to include along its positive effect on flexibility, adaptiveness, and effectivity the corresponding negative effects should "new circles of interest" (Colomy 1990b; Rhoades 1990; Smelser 1974, 1985) form in connection to groups that resist further differentiation.
By introducing micro corrective into its explanatory framework, structural differentiation theory extends its empirical and conceptual applicability to comparative study of individual and group agency and its impact on differentiation. Pioneering work in this regard is Eisenstadt's (1964, 1965, 1971, 1973, 1980) that identifies institutional entrepreneurs as groups of agents that move and direct differentiation as they taking lead in promoting structural change "crystallize broad symbolic orientations in new ways, articulate specific goals, and construct novel normative and organizational frameworks" (Colomy and Rhoades 1994: 554). In contrast to Marx's notion of class, Weber's of the state, and Smelser's of estate, institutional entrepreneurs are groups that are "usually small in number, communicate regularly, share a corporate identity and culture, and are mobilized in pursuit of an identifiable program" (Colomy and Rhoades 1994: 554). Eisenstadt approaches structural differentiation as an outcome of struggles and alliances among groups (Alexander and Colomy 1985a, 1985b) that makes the process of social change fraught with uncertainty and problems as differentiation depends less on rational response to systemic environments than on the "relatively autonomous processes of group formation and functioning and of goal articulation" (Colomy and Rhoades 1994: 555).
Eisenstadt avoids micro reductivism by limits that environments impose on institutional entrepreneurship within which actors pursue their ends as part of entrepreneurial conduct that in his analytical understanding comprises "agentic processes of typification, invention, and strategization" (Colomy and Rhoades 1994: 555). While the notion of institutional entrepreneurship has been applied to explain the rise of bureaucratic empires (Eisenstadt 1963) and development of ancient civilizations (Eisenstadt 1982, 1985, 1990), it can be extended for the "study of micro dynamics affecting differentiation" (Colomy and Rhoades 1994: 555) along dimensions of new differentiation project articulation, project supporting organization development, and other groups and organizations cooptation. Deriving from existential Marxism (Sartre 1968: 91-166) the notion of an institutional project facilitates sociological generalizations by combining construction of organizational or institutional niche, identification of pretexts for change, recommendation of new differentiation levels, employment of institutional prototypes, and elaboration of appropriate imagery (Colomy and Rhoades 1994: 555-556). By proposing institutional projects entrepreneurial groups open a space unfolding between their actions and their macro environments (Sartre 1968: 91), which through interaction with micro dynamics contingently steers course of crystallization of new institutions. The process of leigitimization of the structural change that institutional projects instrumentalize as their pretexts includes condemnation of existing conditions (Turner and Killian 1987: 242-245, 266-272) and evaluative institutional contrast (Shibutani 1970) as show empirical studies of feminist strategies of institutional change in urban police departments (Rose 1977; Turner and Colomy 1988).
Most significantly institutional project is defined by the type of advocated differentiation, scope of the promoted change, and proposed "interchange relations between the focal institutions and other subsystems" (Colomy and Rhoades 1994: 556) as it specifies social sectors of change, indicates its functions, outlines its structure, and makes authority claims. Among the forms of differentiation that institutional prject may advance are autonomous mass media (Alexander 1990a), differentiated public sphere (Mayhew 1990), uneven political party differentiation (Colomy 1990b), unequal functional differentiation (Champagne 1990), and dedifferentiating syndroms (Lechner 1985). The scope of entrepreneurial projects exhibits wide range as their variations include historical revolutions (Eisenstadt 1978), backlash and fundamentalist movements (Lipset and Raab 1978), ethical prophecies (Weber [1922] 1964), cultural revolutions and fundamentalisms (Lechner 1990), and incremental change (Colomy and Tausig 1994). The interchange relations between focal institutitions and their environment take forms of interpenetration (Munch 1987, 1988), which being more widespread is exemplified by relations between educational institutions and the state (Tyack and Hansot 1982), domination, which absolutist states (Anderson 1974), one-party state (Bendix 1978), sectarian dictatorships (Miller 1956), and unencumbered capitalism (Polanyi 1944) embody, and isolation, which corresponds to self-sufficient communities (Berger 1981).
Entrepreneurial projects confront their macro environment as given element of their institutional programs. For instance, educational entrepreneurs endeavor to temper the consequences of political economy (Haskell 1984), educators perceive public high school as means for differential nationalization of immigrants (Tyack and Hansot 1982), secondary education reproduces social and historical patterns of marginalization (Anderson 1988), schools attempt to impart national and moral values to immigrants (Tyack and Hansot 1980), schools try to counteract urban criminality and social problems (Dreeben 1971), schools participate in allocating students into occupational niches (Tyack and Hansot 1980), religious reformers affect social and territorial reach of common schooling (Cremin 1988; Meyer et al. 1979; Tyack and Hansot 1982), and reformers extend social rights by expanding educational system and social services (Perkin 1981; Rodman 1964; Sabine 1961). To extend and justify their project, institutional entrepreneurs employ prototyping based on metaphors giving direction to their activities, frames of reference for innovators and potential supporters, and value-giving archetypes serving as symbolic resource of institutional legitimization.
Cross-societal prototyping occurs in situations of perceived competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis another country, community, or group as is the case when educational systems of industrially advanced and commercially successful countries become models for emulation (Cremin 1961). Cross-institutional prototyping involves "selective borrowing from other institutional spheres in the same society" (Colomy and Rhoades 1994: 559) by introduction of respected practices and metaphors in order to gain legitimacy (Tyack 1974) and by active adaptation of assimilated exemplars (Diggins 1978). Revivalistic prototyping draws on historical exemplars to stress the continuity between advocated institutional project and previously existing forms that lend legitimacy by providing stable frame of reference (Kass 1965). Prototyping takes course over innovative and derivative phases of its implementation (Colomy 1985) that in the first phase articulates, specifies and constructs an altered institutional order while in the second the developing institutional structure itself serves as point of evaluative reference for other reformers (Tyack and Hansot 1982). Typifying processes build upon cultural content of institutional projects that usually refers, in separate or conjoint manner, to injustice of existing arrangements and to legitimization of alternative structures, which formation of differentiated political parties illustrates (Wallace 1969, 1973).
New cultural frameworks facilitate inventive dynamics of institutional project implementation when long-standing conditions become subject of critical reassessement and when more satisfactory alternatives receive expression in social movements for their advocacy (Blumer 1939; Smelser 1991; Turner and Killian 1987). Cultural themes and symbols strategically legitimate introduction of alternatives to institutional order among the examples of which are social progressivism in universal public schooling (Ravitch 1974), "preparation for life" in public high schools (Cremin 1961), and professionalization in civil service and administration (Larson 1977, 1984; Tyack 1974). Institutional projects are subject to continuous revision under the influence of communicative feedback within entrepreneurial group, reconciliation of disagreements over project's objectives, coalitions with other groups with divergent projects, project modification to appease or undermine opposition, and changes in opportunities structure of the macro environments (Colomy and Rhoades 1994: 560).
Institutional projects require group coordination as part of mobilization of means for their realization that also reflects efforts to articulate objectives of innovative action. While below certain thresholds of contention internal conflict is not inimical to effective project organization (Shibutani 1978), when dissent stalls institutional change a more cohesive constellation of actors has to carry forward and sustain the organization. Preexisting communication networks, organizations, and communities are either redeployed in the process of construction of organizations around institutional projects or substantially altered within emergent relations, which "typically involves modification of conventional modes of interaction and the articulation of new relationships" (Colomy and Rhoades 1994: 561). In organization building either redeployment or emergence of relations usually predominate to the extent that the attempts to implement both these types undermine the supporting social foundations of the entrepreneurial project (Calhoun 1983). However, the institutional project redeploying organizations, networks, and communities as it promotes structural change undergoes significant transformation that emergent process within its own organization trigger (Colomy and Rhoades 1994: 562).
The emergent effects of redeployment on the organizations and communities involved in institutional project of structural change subordinates them to the imperatives of the emergent organization that takes shape on the existing but changing institutional base, as was the case with anti-segregation project of more inclusive society (Morris 1981). Emergent dynamics are amplified "when two or more networks, organizations, and/or communities are simultaneously redeployed toward a common end" (Colomy and Rhoades 1994: 562) to sometimes create new institutional structure that can accumulate power and authority in its own right (Branch 1988). Emergent dynamics of institutional entrepreneurship culminates in creation of clearly separate organization that features distinct leadership group and institutional project that sets it apart from preexisting structures (Killian 1984). In the absense of significant barriers to collective action, redeployment of existing structures rather than creation of new not only incurs less expense (Morris 1981) but also follows the strategic consideration of micro-macro dynamics favoring either redeployment or emergence in organization building. Consequently, organizations, networks, and communities rule out their redeployment in support of an institutional project that can negatively affect ties with their organizational environments, which promotes predominantly emergent and innovative organization building for projects that meet with hostility (Hole and Levine 1971; Freeman 1973).
Institutional projects require creation of new organizations also when overcoming resistance of existing organizations and networks can exhaust resources of the entrepreneurial group. However, the assessment of how worthwhile redeployment may prove to be depends on "collective definition of a situation" (Colomy and Rhoades 1994: 563) that by changing the interpretive understanding of the macro environment in which the organization building occurs also alters the perception of strategic interest upon whicb other groups act (Freeman 1973). Among the changes in the macro environments that can diminish the obstacts to the organization building and thus precipitate its formation are unravelling of political and economic alliances, electoral realignments caused by migrations, and international politics (McAdam 1982). Reconstitution of macro environment of networks and communities can foster organization building through, for example, new channels of communication, characteristic culture, increase in similar organizations, identities organized around shared norms (Bledstein 1976; Haskell 1977) and network-related channels of influence (Tyack 1974; Tyack and Hansot 1982), which can enable implementation of related institutiomal projects.
Via reconfiguration of social ties changes in macro environments make available new resources for organization building. In response to environment marked by political fragmentation, weak centralization, and local diversity arise decentralized organizations, which enables them to flexibly react to local conditions, cope with unanticipated events, confront mobilized opposition, and disseminate local project or strategy modifications (Colomy and Rhoades 1994: 565). As internal environments for institutional projects serve incentives relating to their purposes, material rewards, and solidairity providing support for the motivation committed by the members of the entrepreneurial group that through internalization and public circulation of its motives generates support among its adherents and macro environments (Colomy and Rhoades 1994: 565). When envisioned project aims at collective good, rewards for the associated effort that mobilized group reaps (Olson 1965) include material advantages to its leaders in the form of control over significant patronage (Colomy 1985), and powerful administrative posts (Tyack 1974), and such intangible benefits as prestige, elite social circles membership, and public recognition (Colomy and Rhoades 1994: 565).
Whether enduring organization is built on the basis of redeployment or emergence of cohesive groups around institutional projects for their members, regardless of organization size (Olson 1965), they provide both solidary incentives 0f firendship, mutual identification, esteem, and expressive gratification together with respective sanctions, and commitment forms such as sacrifice, investment, renunciation, and communion (Kanter 1972). Taking sustained part in the activities of the institutional project group and in the struggle for realization of its goals can fundamentally change how personal strategic calculations are made by reconstructing participants' schemes of interpretation, conceptions of rewards and risks, and views of continued organizational involvement (McAdam 1988). Internal adaptation carries influence on the type of organization that project group eventually translates into its structure as it affirms the shared values of the group (Rothschild-Whitt 1979). Disagreements over character of the project, its implementation strategies, organization structure, program modifications to enlist support, and accomodations to opposition or recalcitrant environment drive the need for compromise (Turner and Killian 1987) that necessitates articulation of either consistency, coherence, and continuity (Berger 1981) or coertion, exception, denial, and concealment (Pestello 1991).
When project amendments or new strategies are proposed, affective responses are common consequence of compromise (Hochschild 1983) that giving rise to perceptions of unfair redistribution of power or abandonment of core ideas may "endanger concerted action within the entrepreneurial group and the success of the institutional project" (Colomy and Rhoades 1994: 567) which typically calls for misgivings reassessment, project prioritization, and group cohesion mobilization. To implement institutional project its leaders need legitimation, power, and resources that require capacity both to garner agreement of various groups and to surmount opposition the efficacy which is conditional on macro environments. Since strategic action takes recourse to interpretive frameworks and macro structures, theoretical reconstruction of the calculation behind it cannot be restricted to micro level of rewards and costs. Mobilization of support takes typified form of a repertoire of collective action (Tilly 1978) that relies on slow change of action strategies, perceptions of obviousness, and meeting acceptability expectations, which nevertheless leaves room for its reflexive application making tactical adjustments, innovation, and novel action forms possible.
Selection process of action tactics from within the group's repertoire is guided by probable success calculation, associated costs, and response estimates whereas lack of success, high cost, incompatibility with the project, or trenchant opposition prompt selection of alternative or invention of new courses of action. Structure of opportunities, configuration of macro environment, and power of opposing groups condition the propensity of action repertoire for invention so that the greater the levels of differentiation the more dispersed are support resources, the more differentiated and inclusive society is the more likely cross-cutting coalitions are, and the more differentiated symbol systems are the more likely are alternative structures to arise respectively (Colomy and Rhoades 1994: 568). Openness of opportunity structure being dependent on relative position that enterpreneurial groups, their supporting bodies, and their larger constituencies occupy, higher levels of local social differentiation create more openings for mobility and inclusion through which minority groups can improve their position (Alexander 1990b). Under conditions of closed opportunity structure institutional projects promoting greater levels of differentiation have to rely on innovative strategies of action to reach accommodation of their program by political authorities and various elites (Piven and Cloward 1977), which leads these strategies to be subsequently conventionalized, added to action repertoire, and appropriated for other projects.
The tactical dynamics obtaining between project groups and their opponents influences the choice or invention of a particular strategy when adoption and redeployment of tactical innovations prompts tactical counters by their opponents, which neutralizes old and stimulates further strategic inventions (McAdam 1983). Exchange mechanisms facilitate support for an institutional project on the premise of benefits deriving from it such as offers of situational advantages, valuable information, and public legitimation for its allies (Tierney 1982). The application of negative inducement strategies in reaction to intractable constituencies, uncongenial elites, and obstinate opposition relies on perception that their outcome is more effective than restraint from coersion (Turner and Killian 1987), that sessation of attack tactics provides sufficient incentive for consessions (McAdam 1982), and that these macro environments "worsen their condition unless compliance is granted" (Colomy and Rhoades 1994: 570).
The relative amount and structure of resources that institutional entrepreneurs control condition their ability to remunerate supporters and to penalize opponents, which gives inherent advantage to proponents of instututional projects most richly supplied with resouces to become successful entrepreneurs which explains disproportianate elite representation among them (Eisenstadt 1964). Under circumstances of rapid transformations undermining political stability resource-poor groups by taking recourse to diverse forms of mass disobedience can occasionally bring about signficant institutional changes (Piven and Cloward 1977) the process of which is reciprocally amplified within even minimal opportunity structure by the entrepreneurial group's accumulation of resources by appealing to constituencies, networks, and organizations that are sympathetic to their project (Colomy and Rhoades 1994: 570). Entrepreneurs interpetatively align the framing of their institutional project towards complenetarities with orientations of their constituencies, sometimes appealing in universalistic terms beyond their situational advantage (Parsons 1963a, 1963b, 1968), the employed frames of which are "a vital but unmet need, presenting a favorable benefit-cost ratio, invoking solidary ties, and appealing to common value commitments" (Colomy and Rhoades 1994: 571).
The alternatives proposed by institutional projects employ adaptive frames of salient claim to argue for inadequacy of the existing level of differentiation and complementary argument that the promoted program meets poorly recognized needs more adequately (Knowles 1991). Often institutional entrepreneurs depict their project as a suitable investment, exaggerate the anticipated benefits, and underestimate the probable costs (Smelser 1991). Institutional entrepreneurs rely on solidary identification by highlighting commonalities that putatively obtain between themselves, their constituencies, and their potentional allies. Typically entrepreneurs possess an acute awareness to the dominant values and motive vocabularies of their time (Mills 1940). Exchange processes can modify the initial project of institututional innovators as seeking its generalized support in broad outline they modify their program implementation in response to the demads of outside groups on whom access to support and resources is contingent (Colomy and Rhoades 1994: 572). Established authorities may seek to undermine institutional innovation project by assimilation of enterpreneurial organization, cooptation of its leaders, and negotiated exchange of concessions on both sides (Piven and Cloward 1977).
While resistance commonly accompanies efforts to change institutional order the related group conflict does not have direct impact on resultant structural differentiation since possible range of outcomes of the opposition to an enterpreneurial project stretches from failure to even partially realize its goals to nearly complete institutionalization. To derail institutional projects opponents typically deploy countervailing strategies, allies and resources, challenge entrepreneurial frames, and furnish oppositional frames of reference (Colomy 1990a). When the institutional project advancing greater degree of differentiation receives public, formal, and legal affirmation, powerful constituencies can empty it of practical substance by subverting its objectives, which converts structural change into symbolic achievement (Rhoades 1990). Incomplete differentiation is likely outcome of competition between groups with approximately equal power that struggle to control particular functions and dispute rival claims to exclusive authority (Colomy and Rhoades 1994: 573; Surace 1992). In macro environments divided by lines of primordial belonging, competition between enterpreneurial groups creates parallel structures (Smelser 1991: 107; Tyack 1966). Should insitutional entrepreneurs considerably gain in support and resources, persistent struggle by opponents to institional change leads to their eventual adoption of constituent elements of the enterpreneurial project to partially appropriate the resources mobilized by the innovators and to polarize their differences from the innovative project the unintended consequence of which is modification of existing order (Colomy 1985; Colomy and Rhoades 1994: 573-574).
While in the long run implementation of an institional project may meet with success or changes in macro environment can produce favorable opportunity structure (Smelser 1991), in the short run attempts at introduction of new levels of differentiation usually evoke staunch opposition that causing entrepreneurial group to fail can prompt it to redouble its efforts, modify its project, and revise its strategy (Colomy and Rhoades 1994: 574). Should efforts at structural differentiation succeed, its legitimacy and viability may be questioned by its critics on the grounds of divergence from society's most fundamental principles, defense of traditional rights and privileges and of public welfare, and perceived inadequacy in addressing emergent problems (Colomy and Rhoades 1994: 574). Thus, micro correcive of differentiation theory enables systematic and comparative study of institional projects, analytic examination of organization building via support generation and resistance defusion, reflexive account of coalition formation, exchange processes and competition and conflict, and theoretical awareness of contingence on institutional project of adaptive and performative effects its implementation frequently has on further structural differentiation (Colomy and Rhoades 1994: 575).
To examine particular reconfigurations of institutional order, a tenable theory of transformation of modernity has to operate with specific and concrete terms (Alexander 1992) so that its investigation has to include elaboration on its articulation as institional project, its translation into organization building, and its strategies of acquisition of support and prevailing over opposition (Colomy and Rhoades 1994: 575).
Tuesday, November 20, 2007
Analysis of Colomy and Rhoades' (1994) Toward a Micro Corrective of Structural Differentiation Theory
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